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a n d got on with it. No temporizing or bad 
decisions either. 
Not every soldier who served with or under 
Simonds would share this enthusiasm. The 
General's cool, detached, analytical mind was 
accompanied by an overwhelming self-
confidence and a degree of arrogance which 
could make life very difficult for those, who in 
Simonds' view, failed to live up to his standards. 
Simonds did not attempt to lead, he sought only 
to command. 
An army of volunteer citizen-soldiers, with 
an officer corps of widely varying experience 
and ability certainly needed solid 
professionalism at the top, but it also needed 
something more - a type of leadership which 
could raise it above a collection of fiercely 
independent and proud regiments and 
Simonds, like Crerar, could not provide this. 
The following documents are reproduced 
from the War Diaries of the 2nd Field Historical 
Section, July 1944 (National Archives of 
Canada RG24 Volume 17506). Major A.T, Sesia, 
who commanded the unit, tried to record 
Simonds' words in the first extract, but settled 
on a summary of the General's views in 
subsequent reports. 
— Terry Copp 
© Canadian Military History, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1999, pp.69-80. 69 
O n the afternoon of 11 July 1944, a Canadian Corps HQ once again became 
operational on the soil of France. Lieutenant-
General Guy Granville Simonds assumed 
responsibility for 8,000 yards of front in the 
Caen sector. There was little time or inclination 
to mark this event or link it with the memory of 
the vaunted Canadian Corps of World War 1 
fame- there was too much to be done. Elements 
of the newly-arrived 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division would take over part of the line and 
acquire some badly needed experience. Plans 
for the Corps' role in Operation "Goodwood" had 
to be elaborated while Simonds met with his 
Divisional and Brigade commanders. 
Guy Simonds emerged from the battlefields 
of the Second World War with a reputation as a 
brilliant, innovative commander. To his staff 
officers, Simonds was more than a consummate 
professional soldier, he was little short of a god. 
His Chief of Staff, Brigadier N.E. Roger, wrote 
of Simonds: 
Never have I worked for anyone with such a 
precise and clear and farseeing mind - he was 
always working to a plan with a clear cut 
objective which he took care to let all of us know 
in simple and direct terms....He reduced those 
problems in a flash to basic facts and variables, 
picked out those that mattered, ignored those 
that were side-issues and made up his mind 
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that I shall be able to get out to see them in a 
very short time. 
I wanted to take this, the first opportunity 
that I could, to put before you my policy in the 
tactical handling of troops and in administration 
generally. First of all, I would like to say a word 
or two on just where we stand. The Russian 
offensive in the East is going extremely well. From 
the latest reports the Russians are some thirty 
to forty miles from the East Prussian frontier. 
Here in the west, the German formations are all 
committed including two which arrived recently 
from Russia. As far as we can determine, the 
Germans are short of men and equipment, and 
we have not so far encountered any fresh 
formations, nor do there seem to be any in sight. 
Opposite us is the "works" so to speak. I think 
you remember General Montgomery's remarks 
when he spoke to all formations prior to D-Day 
and said that we had the war "in the bag" if we 
made an all-out effort. My view is that we will 
have the war "in the bag" this summer or at least 
in a matter of weeks if we pursue the advantage 
we now hold. I cannot stress too highly what effect 
Address by Lieut.-General G.G. 
Simonds, CBE, DSO 
General Officer Commanding 2nd Canadian 
Corps, to Officers of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade 
at the Chateau near Cairon (962744, Sheet 7F/1) 
on 16 July 1944 
(reported by Major A.T. Sesia) 
Ihave called this conference first to get you together and to welcome 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 
Cdn Armd Bde into 2 Cdn Corps, and secondly 
to say how proud I am to have them in this Corps 
after their fine performance during the past 
month since D-Day. I am sorry to say that of the 
Divisions in the Canadian Army your Division is 
the one that I know the least. In all my previous 
contacts with the Canadian Army there was not 
a formation with which I was not closely 
associated, but your Division was the one with 
which I had had the least contact. I wanted to get 
^around to see the troops and I had intended to 
do so yesterday, but unfortunately circumstances 
prevented me from doing so. However, I expect 
General G.G. Simonds in his command vehicle. 
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finds himself up against stiff opposition he must 
keep finding a way to break through the enemy. 
It is fatal to stop. He must never sit down. He 
must always be doing something. 
Secondly, once you are committed to an 
offensive operation there is no holding your hand, 
regardless of casualties. As a Commander you 
must consider at the outset whether the losses 
incurred are going to be worth the final assault. 
You must determine whether these losses are 
going to be the minimum you can afford in 
relation to the value of the objective. 
We can't fight the Boche without incurring 
casualties and every soldier must know this. My 
point of view is that if I can't embark upon an 
operation to take a certain feature, for example, 
unless it will be useful to me later, the operation 
is not worthwhile. But if the operation is 
worthwhile and I call it off with 50% casualties 
incurred, then I have achieved nothing but a waste 
of lives; if I continue, and incur a further 20% 
casualties and bring the operation to a successful 
conclusion, then the operation is worthwhile. I 
speak of casualties in grossly exaggerated figures. 
In no operation yet have I participated where 
casualties were not between 15% and 25% and, 
even at that, 25% is still a grossly exaggerated 
figure. You must have realized by now, after your 
experience during the past month, that it is 
inevitable in infantry warfare that casualties 
become greatly exaggerated. In the fog of battle 
communications become disrupted and units 
become separated, and when the "survivors" start 
coming in they report that their section, platoon 
or company has been wiped out. It must always 
be realised that when a soldier is separated from 
his comrades he feels that he is the sole survivor, 
and it is only after reorganization, possibly three 
or four days later, that one realizes that casualties 
have been far lower than at first feared. 
PATROLLING 
Another very important point in connection with the Offensive Spirit is the question of 
patrolling. Before the war and even during its 
early days the doctrine of patrolling varied 
between the advantages of a recce patrol and a 
fighting patrol. Since that time the definition of 
both has become confused. From experience I 
say that both types of patrolling must be clearly 
71 
this all-out effort will have on the enemy and its 
advantages to us particularly from the point of 
view of our own troops. If the war drags out, 
normal wastage will ensue and casualties will 
mount up. On the other hand, by making use of 
an all-out effort our casualties may be initially 
high, but in the long run they will be less. I think 
that it is safe to compare the enemy in his present 
situation to a boxer who is groggy on his feet, 
and needs but the knockout blow to finish him 
off. I ask all Commanders here present to put 
first and foremost into their minds the idea of 
the all-out effort. You must always remember that 
if you rest, so does the enemy; and the final 
outcome takes considerably longer. You must 
therefore call on your troops for this all-out effort. 
I want it to be absolutely clear in your minds 
that occasions will arise when I will make heavy 
demands from you at a time when your troops 
are tired, but the enemy is groggy. This produces 
great results and saves casualties. There is always 
a tendency on our part to look at our troops after 
a particularly stiff engagement and consider them 
tired without appreciating, at the same time, that 
the enemy is more so. I think that the German's 
position as a whole is not far from the point of 
cracking up unless he produces fresh formations. 
His prospects of producing fresh formations from 
Russia are at present very slim although he may 
produce some from Italy. There is no doubt that 
he may have a certain amount of reinforcements 
to draw from but these cannot materially alter 
his present position. 
OPERATIONAL POINTS 
Iwould now like to mention a few operational points which I consider essential. First, we 
must have the Offensive Spirit. This is absolutely 
essential, and the drive must always come from 
the top. It has always been written that the 
Commander inspires his troops. With us 
Canadians it is different. Our Commanders are 
inspired by the troops. I have always found the 
troops tired when the commander is tired, yet 
one has only to mingle in with the troops 
themselves to find that the Offensive Spirit and 
the will to carry an all-out effort is always present 
with the Canadian soldier, and it should not be 
destroyed by the flagging spirit of a Commander 
who is tired. The Offensive Spirit does not mean 
running up against a stone wall. If a Commander 
3
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"Recce patrols should be small and made up of experts who know how to creep about in the dark and in 
daylight, without being observed. They must consist of men who are individualists and who enjoy the work. " 
Canadian soldiers from the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment set out for a patrol in Normandy. 
the fighting patrol is working, the recce patrol 
shou ld be ei ther res t ing or seeking fur ther 
i n f o r m a t i o n i n a n o t h e r sec to r . U n d e r n o 
c i r cums tances shou ld you have your scout 
platoon at work when fighting is in progress for 
they should be working hard when you are sitting 
down. Each company should have two scouts in 
each platoon who are experts, and whose job i t 
is to keep you informed at all t imes as to wha t 
you are likely to r u n into. In this connect ion I 
would like to say tha t the teaching in the batt le 
schools is, to my mind, wrong. Briefly, when a 
company is going into the at tack and thinks it is 
bumping into opposition, the forward platoon sits 
and another is sent on a left or right flanking 
move. The Boche sits down and lets the platoon 
come in and witholds his fire when withdrawing 
b u t the first thing the forward platoon knows is 
that it h a s r u n into machine gun fire from 1000 
yards behind. Scouts should precede the platoon 
and be on the alert at all t imes to prevent their 
platoons from walking into this Boche trick. I 
w a r n y o u n o t t o fill y o u r s e l v e s w i t h 
apprehens ions of the enemy's tactics, because 
you should not have apprehensions at all. If you 
are aware of the Boche's tactics, a n d I realize 
that you have all been in battle, you will also know 
that although the Boche is a very good soldier he 
is no match for the Canadian soldier. Our troops 
have been brought up with a different mentality, 
are individualists and imaginative and it is up to 
you not to kill these qualities. The Boche, on the 
other hand , follows a set drill in his tactics and 
seldom deviates from it. 
defined. A recce patrol goes out to get information 
and bring it back. Recce patrols should be small 
and made up of experts who know how to creep 
about in the dark and in daylight, without being 
observed. They m u s t consist of men who are 
individualists and who enjoy the work. Obviously 
the type of m a n required m u s t be one who 
possesses personal courage. But courage is not 
all that he m u s t have. You may have a man who 
possesses considerable courage b u t who, when 
he crawls five feet in the dark, cannot do so 
without cursing. There are also men who possess 
great courage if they are in company with others 
b u t are ineffective if they become isolated. On 
the other hand , there are men who like to play 
alone or with a companion or two. Fighting at 
the present time is not confined on a continuous 
front - both sides have wonderful opportunities 
for good scouting. We m u s t always bear in mind 
tha t the Boche keeps very still in daytime. For 
the experienced there are all sor ts of outward 
signs which scouts learn to interpret. When, for 
instance, all movement h a s ceased in a village 
we can accept it t ha t the Boche is there. When 
civilians are seen to be re turn ing to the village, 
then it is a pretty fair indication tha t the Boche 
has gone. 
A word on fighting patrols. In no sense should 
a scouting platoon be used as a fighting platoon. 
In no sense should fighting personnel be allowed 
to be held above others in your command. This 
is bad for morale. Fighting patrols go on definite 
miss ions to take pr isoners , and they go in on 
information picked up by the recce patrol. When 
72 
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GENERAL REMARKS 
Iam of the opinion tha t troops underes t ima te the effect of artillery fire. I will admit tha t only 
5% of artillery fire h a s a material effect, and that 
95% has an effect on morale; bu t it is in following 
up this effect on morale t h a t the benefit from 
artillery fire is derived. In my experience I would 
say that the Boche recovers easily from a barrage 
in approximately ten minutes. With the Italian it 
was different. It took at least three qua r t e r s of 
an hou r before he would show up his head and 
look around after a barrage. It is vitally important 
that the leading assault troops must follow closely 
on the heels of the firing. During the last war it 
was always said t ha t full u s e of a bar rage was 
not made unless our troops suffered casual t ies 
from it. In other words, un less we follow closely 
behind a barrage and take advantage of its effect 
upon the enemy its value is worthless. We must , 
therefore, be prepared to accept casualt ies from 
shells falling short. 
An important phase in patrol activity which 
m u s t never be lost sight of is the accura te 
interrogation of the patrol when it comes in. 
Patrols at the present time should be organized 
at least on a Brigade level and preferably on a 
Division level. The handling of these patrols and 
their interrogation when they r e tu rn m u s t in 
some respect be the same in which an RAF 
Intelligence Officer interrogates air crews when 
they r e tu rn from a mission. This interrogation 
m u s t be complete in every respect. An example 
of an incomplete interrogation occurred last night 
when one of our patrols reported tha t a Boche 
was seen to throw away his rifle and r u n when 
he was approached by a patrol from 7 Cdn Inf 
Bde. As far as I am concerned I do not know tha t 
the man who threw down his rifle was a German. 
He may well have been a frightened farmer. The 
patrol had not brought back the rifle in question. 
I say tha t if this patrol was close enough to see 
the m a n at night, and also to see tha t he had 
th rown down his rifle, t h e n i t shou ld have 
retrieved tha t rifle. 
"...unless we follow closely behind a barrage and take advantage of its effect upon the enemy its value is 
worthless. We must, therefore, be prepared to accept casualties from shells falling short." Crew fusing shell 
before firing, 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade, Normandy, 28 June 1944. 
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18 sets should be interchanged. The infantry 
officer with the a rmour could then say what he 
wants, and the tank officer with the infantry could 
decide how to do it. 
My final point concerns Battle S tamina . A 
"flash in the pan" formation is useless . It h a s to 
be good to the end. This will only be the case if 
the Commander down to the platoon commander 
or the equivalent will nurse Battle Stamina. This 
h inges on two factors: (a) Physical a n d (b) 
Morale. 
(a) Physical Factor - Good unit administration 
m u s t be exercised at all t imes to keep out 
s ickness . Commanders should be careful to 
leave behind selected personnel as LOBs [Left 
out of Battle]. This becomes most impor tan t 
particularly in the case of heavy fighting. It is 
a vital mis take for a Commander to LOB an 
officer or a m a n of whom he is not certain. He 
m u s t find out once and for all in batt le whether 
or not a m a n can prove himself favourably or 
otherwise. Not to do so is the worst mis take 
tha t can be made to encourage malingering or 
the tendency to go easy hoping to be left out. 
By placing s u c h a m a n into batt le it is possible 
tha t he will prove himself a worthy soldier, or 
if not, he will crack up or become a casual ty. 
From the psychological point of view this m u s t 
be kept in sight at all t imes. 
(b) Morale Factor - Morale is h inged to 
discipline. There is no subs t i tu te for discipline. 
J u s t prior to the war wild ideas on discipline 
were let loose. The presen t form of discipline 
existing in the British Army h a s withstood the 
test of battle, for centuries , and is sui ted to our 
temperament. The worst thing a Commander can 
do i s to r e l ax on d i s c ip l i ne . The G u a r d s 
Battalions have a form of discipline which is 
unique in itself, b u t i t m u s t be realized tha t the 
Guards are not m u c h different t h a n other men 
except that they have been chosen for the number 
of inches between their heads and feet. The 
methods employed to achieve this discipline 
among the Guards is not, however, suited to the 
Canad ian t emperament b u t the evidences of 
results obtained should be the same. 
If you explain to the Canad ian soldier wha t 
is required of h im and give h im a good reason 
for it he will produce the goods every single time 
and do it twice as well as any other individual. 
From the nat ional point of view we m u s t look 
The e s s e n c e of G e r m a n defence is the 
counter -a t tack . You should never be surpr ised 
w h e n h e c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s . You s h o u l d b e 
surprised if he fails to counter-attack. The Boche, 
is very effective with his mortar. Without his 
mortar he is not effective and it h a s been proven 
time and again. I have known instances where a 
hundred bodies, by actual count, of German dead 
were found lying about a small position most of 
whom were killed by small a rms fire. The Boche 
usual ly sites his mor ta r 3,000 to 4 ,000 yards 
behind his FDLs [Forward Defensive Lines]. In 
the at tack, the initial a ssau l t wave should go 
th rough at 3,000 or 4 ,000 yards behind his 
FDLs , i n o r d e r t o b r e a k u p t h e m o r t a r 
organization. This can be done with speed of 
movement on the pa r t of the assaul t ing troops 
a n d will thereby cost the Boche very heavy 
casualt ies and break up his counter-a t tack. To 
achieve this the leading troops m u s t go through 
wi thout bother ing about mopping up and also 
by side-stepping opposition. However, the Boche 
who has been sidestepped mus t not be left alone 
for he can be a source of considerable annoyance. 
Mopping up mus t be done as quickly as possible 
behind the assaul t ing wave. The two requisites, 
therefore, for this type of engagement are: (1) 
Speed in the assaul t wave, and (2) cleaning up in 
the mopping up wave. These requisi tes are the 
only method by which speed is obtained and 
access into the depth required. Between both 
requisi tes a gap will inevitably follow, and this 
gap should not be large. The moppers-up should 
be organized in section columns so that one can 
deal with a pocket while the others go on. They 
should be supplied with plenty of grenades and 
small arms. I am convinced that at tacks in short 
p h a s e s of 1,000 to 1,500 yards each are not 
effective and become very heavily mortared. 
W i t h t h e i n c r e a s e o f h i g h ve loc i t y 
ammuni t ion , armour, especially when working 
with infantry, should not be employed unless 
behind good covering fire and clear of minefields. 
It is all-important that when moving alone tanks 
should cover the movement of other t anks . If a 
regiment is moving in bounds , one squadron 
s h o u l d a l w a y s be emp loyed to cover t h e 
movement of the others against the possibility of 
well-sited 88 mm guns . As far as the infantry is 
concerned the tank assis ts the infantry with fire 
from its gun . It is essential t ha t the closest 
possible contact between both a rms exist and I 
suggest that representatives from both arms with 
74 
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Every effort must be made to ensure that 
the discipline and deportment of our troops is 
kept up to the highest standard. I made it a 
strict rule in the Mediterranean, and I intend 
to carry it out here, that any cases of offences 
against the civil population will not be dealt 
with by the soldier's CO, but by Court Martial. 
Every unit has its "bad eggs" and it is they, 
(fortunately less than 1 % of the total number 
of troops involved), who commit these offences 
and they must be dealt with in no uncertain 
terms. This will will have its effect on other 
troops who might be inclined to commit the 
same offences. One of the offences that is likely 
to be met up with is that of looting. Many cases 
of looting are due to misunderstanding on the 
part of the troops. There has not been much of 
it, but when it has occurred it was generally 
due to troops passing by a wrecked building 
75 
to our contribution in this war in every respect. 
We must ask ourselves what, from the national 
point of view, will Canada get out of this war 
materially? The answer is: Nil. In fact, when 
the war is over we will probably have to dig 
down deeper than ever before into our pockets 
to pay for it. On the moral side, however, what 
do we get out of it? The answer is: A great deal. 
We not only increase our own self-respect as a 
Nation, but we also increase the respect for 
Canada from all other nations who have come 
to realize her greatness. The opinion formed of 
Canada and Canadians by peoples in Europe 
and in Bri ta in will be based upon the 
impression created by the Canadian troops 
they see about them. It is a fact that we are 
ordinarily judged by the external appearance 
and conduct of our t roops. Hence their 
importance. 
"If you explain to the Canadian soldier what is required of him and give him a good reason for it he will 
produce the goods every single time and do it twice as well as any other individual." Privates Eddie Feltham 
(left) and John Cote of the Highland Light Infantry advancing towards Caen, 9 July 1944. 
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"I lay stress on what seems to be little things. Little 
things are important in battle. In battle men risk lives. 
You can't get them to do the big things if they are not 
made to do the little things. " 
Another reason is is tha t troops sometimes j u s t 
don't bother saluting. They follow the line of least 
resistance. Some say: "The hell with it! I saluted 
three officers this morning and that 's enough for 
the day!" A third reason for not sa lu t ing is tha t 
soldiers do not see when officers p a s s by. They 
will not see if they walk with their heads down. 
An alert soldier walks with his head up . It is the 
bus iness of officers to see tha t their soldiers are 
alert. A fourth reason is tha t officers never take 
the trouble to explain the custom of saluting and 
why it is done. Officers should gather their troops 
abou t them at least once a week a n d explain to 
them these and other points which soldiers either 
forget or have not known. I think that we publish 
far too many orders and never enforce them. One 
reason why these orders are neglected is because 
officers lose sight of the fact t h a t in their un i t 
there may be a heavy turnover of new people who 
are not informed on these things. In theory, 
everybody is supposed to know what is published 
in orders, b u t in fact, it is not so. Officers m u s t 
keep their troops in the picture at all t imes. The 
Canadian soldier does not give his best when he 
is not in the picture. 
It is a peculiar fact, bu t it is true, that usually 
t r o o p s in t he forward a r e a s a r e far more 
meticulous about saluting than those at the Base. 
In the Middle Eas t it h a s invariably been found 
tha t the s t a n d a r d of sa lut ing was 100% in the 
Forward Areas, and at Base no one bothered 
about it. It is an indication of a lack of morale 
and the fighting spirit. Saluting will be continued 
in the field except in certain cases. Soldiers when 
not actively employed or when not engaged in 
battle, will salute. Officers will re turn the salute 
and speak to soldiers. On the line of m a r c h 
officers will salute seniors while ORs will continue 
to march at ease. If, for ins tance, a par ty of 
engineers are working on a roadside, I do not 
expect that every time an officer passes they will 
throw down their tools and salute. My experience 
is tha t troops like salut ing if it is done properly 
and if the custom is properly explained to them. 
I lay stress on what seems to be little things. Little 
things are important in battle. In battle men risk 
lives. You can' t get them to do the big things if 
they are not made to do the little things. 
or house and, seeing tha t its occupants h a d 
fled, thought nothing of picking up i tems more 
in the way of souvenirs t han anything else. This 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g m u s t be dispelled by the 
officers. 
It is very important that when things are bad 
the reins should be kept tight. Don't do nothing. 
Commence smartening up, holding, parades, etc. 
Discipline among the officers a n d NCOs should 
always be at its highest. It mus t always be borne 
in mind tha t troops are inclined to get morbid 
after h a r d fighting, especially in the winter 
mon ths . I hope tha t this war will be over before 
the winter mon ths set in. Bad weather is bad for 
troops. 
One point tha t I insist upon and which you 
may consider eccentric is that I place great stress 
on salut ing. First of all, I th ink t ha t in any 
formation we should act as a team, and it is 
inconceivable t ha t in any other form of team, 
members should walk by each other and not give 
some form of recognition. As with everything else, 
salutation in the Army is regulated by a universal 
method. Personally, I hate passing by a group of 
t r o o p s w i t h o u t giving t h e m s o m e form of 
salutation. There are, perhaps, some reasons why 
salut ing drops off. In some uni t s it is likely tha t 
troops do not salute because they resent it. It is 
up to the officers and NCOs in tha t uni t to seek 
out the cause for this resentment and remove it. 
7 6 
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regardless of what he is up against, has always 
continued to be a good soldier right to the bitter 
end. It depends upon our officers to put the idea 
across to the men that, however fluid the situation 
may seem on the Russian front and even on the 
present American front, here in Normandy the 
Boche, although well on the way to defeat, will 
still put up a determined resistance. 
Repeating what he had said on previous 
occasions General Simonds pointed out that if 
the war is prolonged normal wastage will 
continue, and in the long run our casualties will 
be much higher. He said that at present 2 Cdn 
Corps is suffering casualties at the rate of 100 
per day. These casualties arise from such causes 
as shelling, mortaring, sniping and patrol activity. 
If we sat as we are doing for twenty days our 
casualties would amount to approximately 2,000 
which are more, if not equal, to the normal 
casualties sustained by a Corps in a stiff battle. 
Our present situation has got to be exploited to 
the fullest extent no matter how tired our troops 
are. When it is physically possible to do so 
opportunities must be given to the troops for rest, 
and General Simonds emphasized that he 
realized how much reorganization of the fighting 
units and formations under his command was 
required. But the second best must be accepted 
and battle-tired troops must be pushed to the 
bitter end if need be. He would make no promises 
for rest, nor the duration of such rest, and it was 
up to the Commanders to give their best until 
the war finishes - in this theatre, in any case. 
General Simonds then reviewed the strategic 
situation in Normandy. He said that it was the 
Commander-in-Chiefs original intention to use 
Second Army in a holding role to draw onto itself 
as much of the enemy's armour and reserves as 
possible to enable the Americans to secure the 
Cherbourg Peninsula, and then to swing hard 
with a right wing and clear Brittany of the enemy. 
Since 2 Cdn Corps has been in operations, 
we have had two tasks. The first of these, General 
Simonds continued, was to clear FAUBOURG DE 
VAUCELLES and put up bridges across the River 
ORNE in the CAEN sector. This was carried out 
and the casualties sustained were very light. The 
second task was to draw into the area as many 
German troops as was possible. General 
Simonds said: "On the evening of the day of 2 
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Resume of Remarks by Lieut.-
General G.G. Simonds, CBE, DSO 
GOC 2nd Canadian Corps, at "O" Group 
Conference held at 2nd Canadian Corps 
Conference Room, The Chateau, Cairon, on 
30 July 1944 at 1000 hours 
(reported by Major A.T. Sesia) 
The conference was attended by the Heads of Arms and Services 2 Cdn Corps, and the 
GOsC 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Divs, and 4 Cdn Armd 
Div and their Brigade Commanders and 
principal staff officers. The GOC's opening 
remarks referred to two policy letters which he 
issued down to formations and units. The first 
of these dealt with leadership and quoted the 
citation which described the deeds which won 
the Victoria Cross for Major J.K. Mahony, the 
Westminster Regiment (Motor) in Italy. The 
o ther deal t with t r a in ing and the re-
organization of formations. Referring to the 
former, General Sinonds said that in view of 
coming events it was essential that all officers 
were impressed with the sense of leadership 
which should be of the highest order in the 
carrying out of their duties. 
General Simonds then told the assembled 
officers that he proposed to review the position 
of the campaign in Normandy up to date, and 
that he would deal with the present and attempt 
to forecast the future. He said that the war 
situation in general is very favourable and that it 
is doubtful if a more favourable situation will 
arise for us. The enemy are disorganized on the 
Eastern Front and it looks as though they will 
not be able to pull themselves together. He 
expressed it as his personal opinion that he felt 
that the enemy was making a determined stand 
here in Normandy because there was a possibility 
that Hitler had in the back of his mind a faint 
hope of dickering for a separate peace with 
Russia, and for that reason, the will to fight still 
existed among his troops who face us. 
Reviewing the recent battle South of CAEN 
where we were forced to give ground to the enemy, 
General Simonds emphasized that it will be most 
difficult for Commanders to put across to front 
line soldiers who are constantly being shot at the 
notion that the Boche is groggy, and also that 
our task in this recent battle was successful 
in its primary end despite the losses entailed. 
It must be realized that the German soldier, 
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employed and part of one battalion of 3 Cdn 
Inf Div. 7 Armd and the Guards Armd Divs 
were practically intact. General Simonds said: 
"I had ample reserves available and had the 
opportunity presented itself I could have 
pushed home a concerted drive against the 
Boche. But since we had achieved the primary 
object of the operation, and there was no 
purpose in committing my forces any more 
than I had done. I therefore resumed my 
holding role and commenced reorganization to 
wait for an opportunity for another full-scale 
opera t ion . Second Army was in ent i re 
agreement with this policy, and did not want 
me to commit additional forces because what 
could have been achieved by so doing did not 
warrant the scale of forces involved." 
General Simonds said that he wanted every 
Commander to understand that at the present 
time the task of 2 Cdn Corps is a holding one 
and certainly not the type that Commanders and 
troops look forward to. Our next operation will 
probably be a breakthrough and when that 
operation has been mounted no division will stop 
until every reserve has been employed. There 
will be no holding back whatever. Naturally, 
continued the GOC, such an operation would 
not be mounted unless the prospects are more 
than good but he told the assembled officers 
Cdn Inf Div's attack down to FLEURY SUR 
ORNE, I am certain that we went nearly 
through the enemy's lines. We had achieved 
our first objectives and we had, in particular, 
all the air support required and the exact 
targets for them. Unfortunately, the weather 
closed down on us cutting off our air support, 
and the enemy took advantage of this by 
putting in two counter-attacks, and drove us 
back from the ground we gained. In the 
intervening bad weather which followed, he 
heavily reinforced." 
General Simonds said though we failed to 
secure territorial gains, we did achieve our 
primary object and every available enemy SS Div 
was concentrated in front of us, and at that stage 
the US attack in the ST LO sector commenced 
and succeeded. He emphasized that it should be 
stressed to the troops that their contribution 
made for that success. 
When the counter-attacks stopped it was 
decided that no advantage would be gained to 
launch 7 Armd Div and the Guards Armd Div 
who were under his command at the time, unless 
the flanks FONTENAY LE MARMION in the LA 
BRUYERE feature (0756 - 0856 - 0757 -0857, 
Sheet 7F/4) had been secured. The operation 
advanced with all 2 Cdn Inf Div battalions 
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"As a Commander you must consider at the outset whether the losses incurred are going to be worth the final 
assault.... We can't fight the Boche without incurring casualties and every soldier must know this. " A Canadian 
soldier killed in action at Tilly-la-Campagne, 9 August 1944. 
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holds there. For that reason it is up to us to 
continue to make a show of force and, if 
necessary, from time to time to move armoured 
brigades in daylight down to the forward areas 
and trickle them back under cover of darkness. 
General Simonds said that it is his task to watch 
for the opportunity when the Boche weakens that 
pivot and then crack through. Once this takes 
place his whole position in Normandy collapses. 
This is the time when there will be no holding 
back, because it will be the finish of the enemy 
as far as this phase of the war is concerned, 
unless he decides upon a general withdrawal. 
General S imonds said t h a t from his 
experience in fighting the Boche he has found that 
if we attack him on a narrow front he recognizes 
it as a holding attack and lets it spend itself out, 
and then counter-attacks in his own time. By far 
the greatest contributing factor in a holding role 
is to contain a large concentration of armour and 
guns. This is at present being achieved and so 
far there has been no indication that he has 
moved any of his better Panzer divisions from 
the Corps front. 
General Simonds said that effective 1730 
hours this evening 4 Cdn Armd Div will have 
completed their take-over from 3 Cdn Inf Div who 
are going back to rest, and that to ease this 
Division gradually into the "feel of things," he is 
contemplating a small-scale operation to recover 
TILLY LA CAMPAGNE. He considered that it 
would be advantageous for us to dominate the 
feature on which this town stands and it would 
minimize enemy observations of our movements. 
For the future, the GOC said that if all 
continues to go well on the American front to look 
for instructions for a break-through to FALAISE. 
He considers that for this operation he should 
employ not less than three infantry divisions and 
two armoured divisions with an armoured 
brigade with each infantry division, and possibly 
a third armoured brigade in reserve. He said that 
he would not mount the operation without 
complete air support. The main problem which 
we are going to be up against is how to get our 
armour through the gun screen. It was possible 
in the past for our medium guns to knock out 
and "brew up" enemy a r m o u r and gun 
emplacements. But now he has anti-tank guns 
and tanks with long effective fields of fire. One 
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to bear in mind that he will not stop because 
the forward battalions are stopped, nor will he 
stop until every reserve has been employed and 
used up. General Simonds explained that he 
took this view because he has felt that the time 
has now come when we must consider that if 
we are going to put an end to this war at all it 
can only be done by a knock-out blow. The 
enemy, weakened as he is on all fronts, can 
still resist for a long time with the resultant 
unnecessary loss of lives to us. He said that 
we must be prepared to accept initial casualties 
but that in the long run it would pay much 
higher dividends in (a) finishing the war, and 
(b) reducing the overall wastage of casualties 
that would normally ensue from a war of attrition. 
General Simonds then went on to discuss the 
strategic picture as it affected 2 Cdn Corps on 
its immediate front. He commenced by likening 
the Germans position in the CAEN sector to that 
of the situation he had found himself last winter 
in Italy when the main pivot of his defensive role 
lay in PESCARA. He said that the CAEN pivot is 
the enemy's PESCARA of Normandy. The defence 
of ROME rested with the "Rome Line" which 
extended laterally across the Italian Peninsula to 
PESCARA. If he were denied the laterals from 
ROME to PESCARA he would either have to 
denude his stronghold in PESCARA to reinforce 
ROME, or fall back on both fronts. Here in 
Normandy the main pivot of his defences and 
the determining points between an orderly 
withdrawal or a rout rested with the strength with 
which he held the CAEN sector. A glance at the 
map revealed that so long as he held CAEN in 
spite of his weakening position on the American 
front he was still able to swing back 
northeastwards in an orderly fashion and later, 
if need be, commence a gradual withdrawal to 
the North keeping control at all times. This 
explained his sensitivity in this particular sector, 
and it was more important to him to keep 
concentrated as much armour and heavy 
weapons as he could. The position that he holds 
by occupying the high ground in front of us places 
him in the same advantageous situation that 
PESCARA did for him. He can't let go unless the 
situation deteriorates, and it will continue to 
be his pivot back behind the River ODON. 
Our immediate task is to make the threat 
to this pivot so serious that he will not dare to 
reduce the strength of the force which he now 
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flares for spotting, the difficulty in keeping 
direction and the dust raised by air bombing 
which would make it almost impossible to see 
ahead. He thought, however, that by employing 
this armour at night and using moonlight or 
artificial light from searchlights, if there was 
cloud cover, the tanks will get up to the gun 
screen, and he wants the armoured formations 
to practice moving forward to objectives in the 
dark. He said that our light AA could deal with 
enemy flares and, of course, artillery support 
would be available to shoot up the area where 
the flares came from. He was not minimizing 
the risk of such an operation but risks had to 
be accepted if armour was to be brought to the 
line of guns. For air support, he would call for 
a heavy bomber force such as that used in the 
attack on CAEN and this would be employed 
at dusk. He would then arrange for these 
bombers to make a return trip and resume their 
attack as early after first light as it was possible 
for the bombers to refuel and return. The whole 
bomber effort would depend a great deal on 
this "turn around." 
General Simonds then reiterated some of his 
main points and the conference ended. 
or two effectively concealed 88 mm guns could 
knock out a whole regiment of tanks before 
discovered. Our mediums can still knock out the 
old Mk IV but the Panther and Tiger tanks are a 
different proposition. At the present time the 
solution seems to rest in the employment of heavy 
four-engined bombers and rocket-bearing 
Typhoons. A 4,000-lb "block buster" will turn 
over a Panther or Tiger tank on a direct hit or 
near-miss. Our rocket-bearing Typhoons have 
proved very effective during recent days, but it 
must be realized that in employing air support 
in this manner that there is a definite time-lag 
which gives the Boche an opportunity to 
recuperate from the effects of the attack by the 
time either our armour or the infantry get 
through. 
General Simonds said that he was certain in 
his own mind that the best solution to this 
problem would be to employ armour at night, 
although he knew that the armour people 
themselves were reluctant to attempt this. He 
felt that if effectively carried through, it could 
be possible at night to bring armour up forward 
at l eas t 5 ,000 ya rds . He real ized the 
disadvantages such as the enemy's effective 
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"...it will be most difficult for Commanders to put across to front line soldiers who are constantly being shot 
at the notion that the Boche is groggy, and also that our task in this recent battle was successful in its 
primary end despite the losses entailed." Canadian infantry on the move at dawn, south of Vaucelles, 25 
July 1944. 
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